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Abstract 
Improvement of educational attainment in schools in urban, disadvantaged areas is an 
important priority for policy – particularly in countries like England which have a long tail at 
the bottom of the educational distribution and where there is much concern about low social 
mobility. An anomaly in the spatial dimension of school funding policy in England allows us 
to examine the effect of increasing school expenditure for schools in urban areas. This 
anomaly arises because an ‘area cost adjustment’ is made in how central government 
allocates funds to Local Authorities (school districts) whereas, in reality, teachers are drawn 
from the same labour market and are paid according to national pay scales. This is one of the 
features that give rise to neighbouring schools on either side of a Local Authority boundary 
being allocated very different resources, even if they have very similar characteristics. We 
find that these funding disparities give rise to sizeable differences in pupil attainment in 
national tests at the end of primary school. This finding lends adds to the evidence that school 
resources have an important role to play in improving educational attainment and has direct 
policy implications for the current ‘pupil premium’ policy in England. 
 
JEL Classifications: R0; I21; H52 
Keywords: Urban schools, education; resources 
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1. Introduction 
Improvement of the educational attainment of poor children is a top priority in many countries. This is a 
particular problem in countries, like the UK and US, where there are long and sizable tails in the bottom end 
of the adult distribution of basic literacy and numeracy skills (OECD, 1995). The bottom tail is heavily 
populated with people who have been disadvantaged since childhood.1 An analysis for recent cohorts of 
school children in the UK finds that there is a considerable attainment gap at school entry between pupils 
eligible to receive free school meals and the rest which widens over time (National Equality Panel, 2010).2 
Many of these children live in inner-city urban areas.  
 In England, much controversy has arisen because closely neighbouring schools with similar pupil 
intakes can receive markedly different levels of core funding if they are in different education authorities. 
This happens partly because of rules in how funding is allocated to Local Authorities by central government. 3 
In brief, ‘area cost adjustments’ are made that are intended to compensate for differences in labour costs 
between areas whereas in reality teachers are drawn from the same labour market and are paid according to 
national pay scales. Consequently, schools which are close together but in different Local Authorities can get 
very different levels of funding, despite being otherwise very similar in their geographical location, catchment 
areas and student intakes. Primary schools in urban areas are particularly exposed to this funding anomaly, 
since they tend to be close together and attract pupils from the local area in which they are located. These 
schools also have a relatively high percentage of poor children. This anomaly in the English funding system 
therefore allows us to evaluate the effect of expenditure on such schools using boundary discontinuity 
techniques. In the education literature, these techniques have often been used to look at the impact of school 
test scores on house prices as well as being used in other areas of economics (e.g. the taxation literature).4  We 
                                                     
1 It has long been established that family background and early childhood experiences are the most important 
determinants of educational outcomes (Coleman, 1966). The relationship between family background and educational 
attainment is stronger in England than in any of the 54 countries included in the TIMSS study (Scheutz et al. 2005; 
Blanden, 2009).  
2  Specifically, the proportion of poor children reaching the ‘expected level’ at school entry (the ‘Foundation Stage’) is 
22 percentage points lower than others. This widens over time. For example, on leaving school only 13 per cent of pupils 
eligible to receive free school meals go on to higher education compared to 32 per cent of all others (NEP report. p.341). 
3 Local Authorities are the local government districts through which most schooling in England is organised. We are 
primarily interested in differences between local authorities in the funding received from central government. Another 
source of variation (where we do not have good information) is different rules in how Local Authorities allocate funding 
within areas. 
4 With respect to the literature on the effect of test scores on house prices, papers that use regression discontinuity 
methods include Black (1999), Kane et al. (2005), Fack and Grenet (2008) and Gibbons et al. (2008). The method is used 
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show that schools on either side of Local Authority boundaries receive different levels of funding and that this 
is associated with a sizeable differential in pupil achievement at the end of primary school.  
 This investigation is important for two main reasons. Firstly, improving the attainment of children in 
disadvantaged urban areas is a top priority because of concerns about economic inequality (of which 
education is one aspect) and the heavy bottom tail of the educational distribution. It is important to identify 
the effects of expenditure on this population. In fact, the UK government is introducing a ‘pupil premium’ 
that is directed at pupils from deprived backgrounds. The level of the pupil premium (£430 per pupil) will be 
the same for every deprived pupil no matter where they live. This investigation gives us a good idea of the 
likely impact of such a policy. 
Secondly, there is an age-old debate in the academic literature on the causal effect of raising school 
expenditure on pupil attainment. The relationship is hard to identify because expenditure is often allocated to 
schools partly on the basis of need (which is negatively related to pupil attainment). Studies that identify the 
effect in a convincing way are relatively few and there are very different views on the overall interpretation of 
the literature from economists working in this field. Hanushek (2008) argues that accumulated research says 
that there is currently no clear, systematic relationship between resources and student outcomes. However 
high quality studies that do show effect include Angrist and Lavy’s (1999) study on the effect of class size in 
Israel; studies on the experimental Tennessee STAR class size reduction (Krueger, 1999; Krueger and 
Whitmore, 2001); and studies that have made use of student finance reforms (Guryan, 2001; Roy, 2004). 
There have also been a couple of recent papers in England that have found modest effects of increased school 
resources (Machin et al. 2010; Holmlund et al. 2010).  
 
 To preview our results, we show that schools close to Local Authority boundaries that are well 
matched in terms of pupil characteristics do receive different levels of funding from central government and 
these differences in resources are associated with differentials in pupil performance. Specifically, we group 
schools close to Local Authority boundaries into neighbourhood clusters on the basis of proximity and the 
extent of disadvantage (as measured by the proportion of children eligible to receive free school meals). We 
                                                                                                                                                                           
in many other areas of economics – for example Cushing (1984) uses it to look at the effect of taxation on house prices. 
Duranton, Overman and Gobillon (2011) look at the effect of taxation on firms using a combined discontinuity and 
instrumental variables methodology that is similar to ours.  
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instrument school expenditure using variables that capture cross-boundary variation in the funding formula. 
Our results imply that an additional £400 per student could raise achievement by around 10 per cent of a 
standard deviation. These effects, are however higher in schools that have higher proportions of 
disadvantaged students. The effects reported here are larger than those typically found in the literature and 
suggest that increasing school expenditure has an important part to place in raising educational attainment in 
disadvantaged urban areas. Although we cannot provide decisive evidence on the channels through which 
increased spending is effective, we provide some additional evidence on how school spending responded to 
the cross-boundary income differentials in these urban schools. We find that the additional income was spent 
disproportionately on learning resources, supplies and bought-in professional services, rather than teaching 
staff. These changes in the budget shares are, however, quite small. 
The remainder of our paper is structured as follow: we discuss the institutional structure of schools in 
England and how funding is allocated (Section 2); data (Section 3); empirical strategy (Section 4); regression 
results (Section 5); and discussion and conclusions (Section 6).  
 
2. Education in England: the Institutional Structure 
In England, there is a National Curriculum and years of compulsory education are organised into four 
‘Key Stages’ (ending at the age of 7, 11, 14 and 16). At the end of primary school (end of ‘Key Stage 2), all 
students in England undertake national tests in English, Maths and Science. These are national tests that are 
externally set and marked. They are important in the accountability system since they form the basis of 
School Performance Tables (or ‘league tables’) at the end of primary school. Our outcome variable will be 
test scores at this stage of education (when children are aged 11).  
 There are about 15,000 primary schools in England. Schooling is organised at the local level by Local 
Authorities, which are usually the same bodies as the local councils that control other aspects of local 
government. The majority of pupils attend ‘Community Schools’ (i.e. 67% of pupils). In this case, the Local 
Authority employs the school’s staff, owns the school’s land and buildings and has primary responsibility for 
deciding the arrangements for admitting pupils. In the case of oversubscription, the most commonly used 
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criteria for admissions are a siblings rule and proximity to the school.5 Most other primary schools are faith 
schools. In some cases, these schools have greater autonomy from the Local Authority and an obligation to 
raise part of the capital funding (‘Voluntary Aided schools’). Also, oversubscription criteria include affiliation 
to the religious denomination of the school. We restrict our attention to children attending Community 
schools as they are more homogenous in their funding, governance and admissions structure and thus easier to 
match across Local Authority boundaries. 
Most funding to schools goes through Local Authorities (of which there are 150). Over the period 
relevant to this study, most funding gets allocated to Local Authorities using a national formula and then 
Local Authorities each use their own formula to allocate this funding to schools.6  When the funding gets to 
schools, it is for the school to decide how to use it, although the bulk of expenditure is on teacher pay which 
follows national pay scales. The broad allocation of spending is as follows: 60% on teachers; 20% on support 
staff or other staff; 6% on building and maintenance; 5% on learning resources/IT and 8% on a residual 
category. This has changed little over time (Holmlund et al. 2010). 
Key features of national funding is that there is a basic allocation per pupil, with an allowance made for 
area (‘area cost adjustment’), sparsity, additional educational needs and ‘high cost’ pupils.7  There have been 
some changes to the formulae over time (as documented in West, 2008). For example, in 2006/07 the funding 
formula changed to the ‘Dedicated School Grant’.  However, this was based on similar principles to the 
earlier formula (including adjustments for area and educational need) but introduced greater complexity, with 
additional funding strands to support national educational priorities.  
We are mainly concerned with the aspect of the national formula relating to the ‘area cost adjustment’. 
This reflects two kinds of difference between areas in costs: differences in labour costs (i.e. the main factor) 
and differences in business rates paid on local authority premises. The ‘labour cost adjustment’ is based on 
the differences in wage costs between areas. The underlying rationale is that local authorities have to compete 
                                                     
5 The Schools Admission Codes sets out rules for admissions criteria. Notably, student ability or family income cannot 
be used as a criterion. 
6 There has been a recent move to give many more schools autonomy. In this case funding will come directly from 
central government rather than through the Local Authority. However, this initiative is very recent and does not affect 
most schools in our sample. 
7 Some of the indicators used to measure additional education needs and ‘high cost’ pupils have changed over time. An 
example of what counts as ‘additional educational needs’ is the proportion of children who do not speak English as a 
first language; measures of deprivation. Indicators used for ‘high cost’ are the proportion of children with a low birth 
weight and the proportion of adults on income support in the Local Authority.  
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for staff with other employers and therefore need to pay the local ‘going rate.8 This is worked out by applying 
regression analysis to the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings. An index of ‘labour cost adjustment’ factors 
are then produced and used in the formula to allocate education resources from central government to local 
authorities. However, this extra funding does not necessarily get passed on to teachers as they get paid 
according to national pay scales – with very limited regional variation.9 Unsurprising this has provoked 
considerable controversy over time. For example, a recent newspaper article reports a review of the situation 
of a Local Authority in London (Haringey): ‘under the current system, the borough is treated as outer London 
even though the challenges its schools faces and its teachers pay are in line with the inner-city areas like 
Camden, Hackney and Islington. It means each pupil in Haringey received £1,300 less in funding per 
pupil…’10 We make use of this funding anomaly to identify the effect of school expenditure on similar 
schools either side of an administrative boundary. Further detail on the mechanics of the ‘area cost 
adjustment’ is described in the section below.  
3. Data 
Our study is based on the National Pupil Database (a census of all students in state schools) between 
2002 and 2009. The data set contains information on the national test scores of all 11 year olds in England 
(i.e. at the end of Key Stage 2) in English, Maths and Science. As there is no grade repetition in the English 
system, all pupils are in the same year group. We use the average score across these subjects as our outcome 
variable. We also investigate the impact of school expenditure on each subject separately.  
The National Pupil Database also has information on the prior attainment of each person - age 7 tests 
(i.e. at the end of Key Stage 1) in reading, maths and science. Demographic information included in the data 
set relates to gender, ethnicity, whether English is his/her first language, whether the pupil is known to be 
eligible for Free School Meals (an important indicator of socio-economic disadvantage). Geographic 
                                                     
8 See http://www.local.odpm.gov.uk/finance/0708/acameth.pdf 
9 There are four scales according to geography: Inner London; Outer London; ‘The Fringe’ (i.e. a small number of areas 
that are within largely rural Local Authorities); and the rest of England and Wales. These differentials in teacher pay do 
not correspond to the ‘area cost adjustment’. The former is more refined (i.e. there are many areas) and much larger than 
differences in teacher pay across these regions. Nonetheless, differences in teacher pay across areas can be a cause of 
resentment (e.g. if they work in Inner London rather than Outer London) since teachers do not necessarily live in the 
Local Authority where they teach. 
10http://www.haringeyindependent.co.uk/news/education/8863493.Gove_promises_to_consider__unfair_funding__for_
Haringey_schools/. 18 February 2011 
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information on the pupil’s home residence is also available at ‘output area’ (i.e. small geographic clusters of 
households).11 This can be linked to local house prices (from the Land Registry) and an index of income 
deprivation: the IDACI index (i.e. Income Deprivation Affecting Children: calculates the proportion of 
children under the age of 16 that live in low income households) The individual-level data can also be linked 
to school-level information in the Annual School Census (such as pupil numbers; the proportion of pupils 
eligible for Free School Meals in the School) and financial data on schools (from the ‘Consistent Financial 
Reporting’ data set). This contains detailed information on school expenditure and income sources. 
We have information on national funding formula over time for Local Authorities. This includes how 
funding is allocated on the basis of Additional Educational Needs (AEN) and the ‘Area Cost Adjustment’. In 
primary schools the AEN index is based on a weighting according to the number of children of families 
receiving various types of benefit (i.e. Income Support/Job Seekers Allowance; Working Families Tax Credit) 
and the proportion of pupils who do not speak English as a first language.  
The ‘Area Cost Adjustment’ (ACAs) is fundamental to our empirical strategy. The ACAs are produced 
by the department of Communities and Local Government, and the methodology is discussed in CLG (2007). 
As discussed above, ACAs reflect two kinds of difference between areas in costs: differences in labour costs 
(the Labour Cost Adjustment, LCA) and differences in business rates paid on local authority premises (the 
Rates Cost Adjustment, RCA). The Labour Cost Adjustment component is estimated from wage regressions 
estimated on a large national sample of employees – the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings. Essentially, 
log wages are regressed on a set of individual characteristics (including occupational controls, age, gender, 
industry) and geographical area fixed effects. The LCAs are then estimated as wage indices from the area 
fixed effects. For determining the education ACA, the RCA and LCA are weighted by according to the 
estimated contribution of labour (80%) and rates (between around 1% and 2% ) to education costs, so the 
LCA is by far the most important factor and the rates adjustment is inconsequential. For example, the RCA 
for Inner London for the 2008/9 index was 1.63 and the LCA was 1.32, but the Inner London overall ACA is 
1.271 (see CLG 2007, 2005). Oddly, a lower limit is applied such that the ACAs are lower-truncated at the 
mean, such that areas with an average or lower than average wage index are given an  ACA of 1. Areas with a 
                                                     
11 The recommended size for ‘output areas’ is 125 households. There are 175,434 OAs in England. They are based on the 
2001 Census. 
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higher than average wage index are assigned the actual estimated value (e.g. 1.1. if the index is 10% above 
the mean). The logic of for this truncation is not completely clear, but arguments appear to be political and 
have to do with not wanting to ‘penalise’ low wage areas with lower central government funding allocations. 
We have this education ACA data for every year. The ACAs have the following consequences for real 
per-pupil funding differences between neighbouring schools in adjacent LAs. Firstly the ACAs are derived 
from national wage data on the private and public sectors (the New Earnings Survey/Annual Survey of Hours 
and Earnings series), but teacher pay is highly regulated by union bargaining at the national level and so does 
not vary between labour markets in the same way as wages in general. Secondly, the ACAs are defined for 
sub-regional geographical units that are aggregates of LAs, so neighbouring LAs can receive different levels 
of per-pupil funding simply because they have been allocated to different ACA regions. All these factors 
together can lead similar neighbouring schools in adjacent LAs to receive very different levels of per pupil 
funding, and it is these cross-boundary differences in LA funding and ACAs that we exploit in our empirical 
analysis. 
To set up these data for our empirical analysis, we carry out a number of data manipulations using a 
Geographical Information System, computing distances between each school and its nearest neighbours based 
on the school postcode coordinates, distances to Local Authority boundaries. We also derive a subset of LA 
boundaries that do not coincide with geographical features (major roads, motorways, railways) using feature 
data from the Ordnance Survey (these geographical data were obtained from the UKBORDERS and Digimap 
services at www.edina.ac.uk). 
4. Empirical strategy 
4.1. General principles 
The central aim of the empirical research is to answer this question of whether additional school 
resources raise student achievement, with a particular focus on low-income, low achieving children in urban 
schools. All research that aims to answer this  question has to address concerns that any estimated statistical 
association between resources and achievement is not causal. These concerns arise because the resources a 
school receives are dependent on the characteristics of the school, neighbourhood and its student intake, 
which are in turn correlated with student achievement. 
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To solve this identification problem, we employ a research design that combines elements of matching, 
regression discontinuity and instrumental variables. This design makes use of funding differentials that occur 
for similar schools located on opposite sides of Local Authority (school district) boundaries. These funding 
differentials arise because central government funding formulae pay out different per-pupil grants to Local 
Authorities (LAs), on the basis of average LA demographics and the wages in the labour market in which the 
LA is assumed to operate. In turn, LAs distribute these grants to schools, but not in ways that compensate for 
the specific circumstances of each school in their jurisdiction. Schools in adjacent LAs but close to the 
boundary will tend to be more similar to each other in terms of neighbourhood, intake and labour market than 
they are to the LA as a whole. On account of being located on either side of the boundary, they will receive 
differential funding from their respective LAs even though they operate in very similar contexts. As discussed 
above, this funding anomaly is particularly pertinent with respect to the Area Cost Adjustments (ACAs) that 
are used in central government formulae to compensate for wage differentials across labour markets, since 
neighbouring schools can receive very different per-pupil resources to compensate for inter-labour market 
wage differentials, even though close neighbouring schools are, self-evidently, in the same labour market and 
face the same prices for labour and other inputs12. Our method therefore uses these discontinuities in LA 
funding, and discontinuities in the ACA indices, as instruments for differences in school expenditure across 
LA boundaries.  
4.2. A more formal exposition 
Our empirical estimates centre on estimating the parameter β in regression models of the form 
Yisjt= βEsjt + µst + θg + εisjt         (1) 
where Y is student i's key stage 2 test score (an average across three subjects, Maths, Science and 
English) at the end of primary school (age 11), Esjt is a measure of per-student, current expenditure in school 
                                                     
12 In some areas, the wages schools have to pay their teachers are higher in high-ACA areas due to the London 
weighting on pay scales as discussed in footnote 9, but in general it is up to school management to decide whether they 
use additional resources on teacher pay or other expenditure items.. 
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s, located in neighbourhood j, in the years leading up to year t13. Optional control variables (e.g. for pupil 
background and prior achievements) can be included, but we suppress these in the notation for simplicity. 
Pupil achievement is, in part, determined by unobserved school effects (µst), neighbourhood effects (θg) and a 
standard random error term (εisjt). School expenditure is endogenous to pupil performance (Y), because it is 
correlated with these school and neighbourhood effects through central government and LA funding 
decisions, and because of schools' own fund raising and expenditure decisions. Note, our empirical analysis 
will allow that these neighbourhood effects vary by year, but we suppress this for notational simplicity. So, 
the fundamental identification problem in estimating the coefficient β, interpreted as the causal linear effect of 
resources on achievement, is that school resources Esjt are correlated with µst + θg. 
To assist with understanding our empirical strategy, it is useful to write out a representation of the 
process determining school expenditure in terms of its essential components: 
Esjt = α1fst +α2gjt +α3hlt        (2) 
where α1fst represents school fund raising, (and school-level decisions about borrowing and saving), α2gjt 
represents income allocated to the school by the LA in relation to its neighbourhood location and expected 
intake, and α3hlt represents LA average per-pupil income from central government grant. The last component 
is determined by central government funding formulae, which are based on a national per-pupil baseline 
expenditure (clt) and additional components to compensate for LA educationally relevant demographics (zlt - 
mainly families on Income Support, children with English as an Additional Language, and families with  
Working Families Tax Credits and wage costs ACAlt) i.e. 
hlt = clt + zlt + acalt        (3a) 
Esjt = α1fst +α2gjt + clt + zlt + acalt      (3b) 
Our estimation strategy for (1) is a differencing-based, discontinuity design, combined with an 
instrumental variables (IV) approach using instruments explicit in equation (3).14 This strategy uses cross-
sectional differences in the funding formula over closely spaced schools, and changes in the funding formula 
over time that (we argue) are uncorrelated with changes in factors affecting these schools. We firstly eliminate 
                                                     
13 We use means in the 4 preceding years, spanning the key stage 2 phase in primary education 
14 One fixed-effect method would be to difference equation (1) over time in a standard panel data estimator. This is the 
approach used by Holmlund, McNally and Viarengo (2010) using similar data to ours. However, there is very little 
variation over time in the ACAs used in this study, so time differencing is inappropriate in our context. 
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neighbourhood factors common to neighbouring schools using a within-groups fixed effect estimator to 
difference out θg, in which the groups j are defined by clusters of neighbouring schools (which we discuss 
later). This yields differenced versions of (1) and (3): 
DYisjt= βDEsjt + {Dµst + Dεisjt}       (4a) 
DEsjt = α1Dfst + Dhlt         (4b) 
where the D represents the within - j transformation. This is not an effective strategy for the full set of  
schools, because the differences in central government grants to LAs are zero by construction within LAs 
(Dhlt in 4b). In addition, neighbouring schools, with similar characteristics, within the same LA probably 
receive very similar levels of funding delegated from the LA. Therefore, a large proportion of the residual 
variation in funding differences between schools within the same LA in equation (4a) would be due to school-
level decisions, or components of LA-delegated funding that relate to school attributes which are not 
controlled by spatial differencing. Both of these components are potentially correlated with the school-by-
year effects (fst). 
However, building on the boundary regression discontinuity design literature (Black 1999 etc.), we can 
exploit the discontinuity in school funding between neighbouring schools across LA boundaries, arising from 
Dhlt, for the subset of schools that share the same geographical neighbourhoods but are on opposite sides of 
the LA boundary. The idea is then to use these core differences in funding between LAs (Dhlt) as a source of 
exogenous variation with which to identify β in equation (4a). 
We will present a number of estimates based on this research in our empirical results. Firstly we present 
estimates of equation (4a). On its own, this is still ineffective, because there remain differences in school 
expenditure decisions which are  correlated with the school-by-year fixed effects (Dfst) due to unobserved 
differences between schools that are not fully controlled by the discontinuity design. One solution is to 
replace school-level expenditure differences (DEsjt) with LA level average expenditure per-pupil differences, 
thus eliminating school-specific expenditure components. However, our estimate of  β then yields an estimate 
of the response of pupil achievement to LA- average expenditure, rather than school-specific expenditure. Our 
preferred strategy is to use the instruments explicit in the funding mechanism. 
A second solution, therefore, would be to use LA-level income differences from central government 
(Dhlt) as an instrument for school-level expenditure differences (DEsjt). However, due to changes in the 
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central government funding system, we do not directly observe a central government grant to primary schools 
after 2005/6.15  However, we can use the mean income delegated by LAs to schools within their jurisdiction  
as a potential instrument, since this is free of school-specific components (Dfst) and determined, for the most 
part, directly by the grant from central government.  
There is still some danger in using cross-boundary differences in LA funds delegated to schools as an 
instrument in this context, because this could in part indicate differences between LAs in terms of 
demographics, administrative effectiveness and strategic direction which are not effectively controlled for by 
the boundary discontinuity design. We will partly address this issue by matching schools according to a 
measure of disadvantage (i.e. the proportion of children eligible to receive Free School Meals in the school), 
as well as by geographical proximity when forming our neighbourhood clusters j. We can also control for the 
index of Additional Educational Needs (AEN) used in the formula that determines funding to LAs. However, 
an alternative solution is to use the differences in Area Cost Adjustments (Dacalt) between LAs as instruments 
for the differences in school-level expenditure. The identifying assumptions are that the differences in the 
ACAs between neighbouring schools, across LA boundaries, are correlated with differences in school 
expenditure, but uncorrelated with differences in the characteristics of schools and their students. These 
assumptions seem plausible given that the ACAs are intended to compensate LAs for differences in labour 
costs, and yet closely neighbouring schools are self-evidently in the same labour market. 
4.3. Defining matched k-school clusters 
We now explain how we define school 'neighbourhood' clusters (j) and implement the fixed effects 
estimator in (4a/b). To create a matched school cluster of size k, we take an 'origin' Community school and 
match it to its nearest k-1 neighbouring Community schools in an adjacent LA by year, where these 
neighbours are within 2km straight line distance and fall within 5 percentiles of the origin school in the 
distribution of proportion of Free School Meal (FSM) students. The intention here is primarily to match 
schools in terms of neighbourhood j and basic school type, allowing us to eliminate unobserved 
neighbourhood and school-type fixed effects (including labour market effects). However, additional matching 
                                                     
15 After this year, central government did not provide a ring-fenced grant to LAs for primary school spending but 
switched to a block grant to cover all types and phases of school (the Dedicated Schools Grant) 
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by FSM also eliminates potential differences in FSM proportions, which may reflect LA-average FSM 
differentials and hence enter into the between-LA funding differences, or may result in differential funds 
being allocated to schools within LAs (e.g. if some LAs provide compensating resources to disadvantaged 
schools). 
We do this matching for all Community schools, but exclude any cases in which there are zero FSM-
matched schools within 2km. The maximal value of k we will use is 8 (implying we match each school to its 
nearest 7 schools). The minimum value of k we use is 2, implying we match each origin school to its nearest 
school across the LA boundary. These k schools are 'stacked' in a panel format, and students assigned to their 
corresponding schools to create a student level data set. So each student in an 'origin' school s in a k-school 
cluster becomes grouped with other students in the nearest k-1, FSM-matched schools in adjacent LAs. This 
student may appear again in the dataset, because the 'origin' school s may appear as a matched school for 
another origin school s' in an adjacent LA. The origin school identifiers s , s', s'' etc. serve as identifiers for 
the  school clusters j in the within-groups regression (4a/b). In addition, the same schools (but with different 
students and different expenditures) appear in our data in different years. 
Clearly, this setup generates a complex data and error structure, with implications for the estimated 
standard errors on the regression coefficients. For this reason, we make our standard errors robust to arbitrary 
correlation in the unobservables within LA boundary groups, by standard 'clustered' standard error methods. 
These LA boundary error clusters are groups of schools for which the same pair of LAs appears for either the 
'origin' or 'matched' school. Clustering the standard errors in this way allows for error autocorrelation induced 
by the repeated observations in the data setup, caused by spatial autocorrelation along LA boundaries, or 
serial correlation within schools, over time. 
One important point to note is that this research design creates a selected sub-sample of schools and 
students: those Community schools that are located close to LA boundaries and have k-1 matchable 
Community schools within 2km. The schools in these boundary sub-samples are likely to be primarily urban 
(given the greater density of schools and LA boundaries within urban areas), with all thit entails in terms of 
student demographics and school context. To the extent that the effects of expenditure are heterogenous 
across school and pupil types, the results we present are  specific to schools and students of the type in our 
boundary sample, rather than the general population, which motivates our specific research focus on 
- 13 - 
disadvantaged students in urban schools. This is an inevitable consequence of any research design that 
isolates specific non-random subgroups in the population in order to construct counterfactuals (including most 
regression discontinuity designs). Our additional results on heterogeneity by student and school type (see 
section 4.5 below) shed further light on the generalisability of the findings. 
4.4. Evaluating the strategy and instruments 
The identifying assumption in our preferred IV strategy is that the differences in the ACAs between 
neighbouring schools, across LA boundaries (and within boundaries over time16) are correlated with 
differences in school expenditure, but uncorrelated with differences (and changes) in the characteristics of 
schools and their students. Our alternative IV strategy assumes that difference between the average grant paid 
by LAs to its schools and the average grant paid by an adjacent LA to its schools is uncorrelated with the 
differences in characteristics between neighbouring schools in these adjacent LAs.  We present a number of 
tests of these assumptions. Firstly, we look at how sensitive our estimates of β are to the inclusion of control 
variables for student demographics and prior achievements (namely test scores at age 7, key stage 1), and 
other components in the central government school funding formula (zlt in equation 3a/b). Secondly we 
present 'balancing' tests to show that instruments are uncorrelated with differences in student characteristics 
across LA boundaries. These balancing tests involve testing for zero coefficients in a series of regressions of 
student and student neighbourhood characteristics on ACAs, using school-by-year aggregated data, 
transformed to deviations from school-cluster means (as in the main regressions). 
A further potential threat to our identification strategy, often raised as a criticism of studies that use 
administrative boundaries as a source of discontinuity, is that the administrative boundaries coincide with 
physical features such as roads and railways that bisect geographical areas into distinct communities, so that 
the neighbouring schools in adjacent LAs are not in practice in the same neighbourhoods, and the 
neighbourhoods may differ on unobservable dimensions. To assess this hypothesis, we re-estimate our main 
instrumental variable specifications using the sub sample of schools that are separated by boundaries that do 
                                                     
16 This constitutes only a small part of the variation in our data. 
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not coincide with railways, major roads, or motorways (our boundary sample already excludes schools 
separated by major coastal water features such as estuaries).17  
4.5. Extensions to the main methods 
In addition to the baseline estimates of β in our LA boundary sub-sample we offer a number of 
extensions which potentially lead to additional insights into which students benefit and in what ways they 
benefit from additional funding. In particular, we are interested in whether additional funding is more 
effective for some students than others, and more effective in some school contexts than in others, and 
whether it has more impact on some subjects than others. To this end, we estimate regressions separately for 
students in different demographic categories (FSM, non-FSM, boys, girls, white, non-white, high and low 
prior achievement - ks1 scores). In all these cases, our estimates can only partially answer our questions 
because we do not have expenditure split by subject area, nor do we know on which students the money is 
being spent. Hence, the estimates depend on both the response of outcomes in a given category (subject, or 
student type) to expenditure in that category, and on the way that schools, on average, allocate their 
expenditure between these categories (i.e. how much of additional expenditure goes into maths teaching 
relative to English, or into lower achieving children relative to high achieving children). More concretely, we 
can answer questions about how achievements in schools in different contexts respond to increased 
expenditure by splitting our sample into different school types, estimating regressions separately for schools 
with above/below median proportions FSM, above/below median indices of student's residential 
neighbourhood deprivation (IDACI indices - see the data section), and above/below median average ks1 
scores. Finally, we re-estimate our IV estimates of equation (4a/b) separately for ks2 Maths, Science and 
English tests. 
4.6. Evidence on expenditure patterns 
Using our methods, it is not possible to estimate what types of expenditure are most or least effective in 
raising achievements, because we do not have sufficient instruments to identify separate causal effects for 
different expenditure categories. We do, however, provide some insights by looking at how the overall 
                                                     
17 We find those sections of the LA boundaries that ‘intersect’ primary roads, railways, and motorways and drop school 
clusters which have these boundary sections as their nearest LA boundary. 
- 15 - 
funding differences affect spending in various categories using the detailed breakdown available in our school 
expenditure data. This is achieved by estimating a set of expenditure share equations similar to (4a/b) at 
school-by-year level, but replacing test scores with expenditure shares as the dependent variable, and using 
LA-income differences as instruments for school total expenditure. This approach is similar to that commonly 
used for estimating household consumption ‘Engel curves’ in the consumption literature, where the equations 
would typically include additional controls for goods’ prices. In our case we use the school-cluster fixed 
effects to control for prices: that is we are comparing expenditures in closely spaced schools, which we 
assume face identical prices for their inputs.   
5. Results 
5.1. Description of the sample 
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for the full national sample and the boundary sample based on 4-
school clusters, which will form the basis for most of our analysis (though we will report results for 
alternative sized clusters). Figure 1 maps the schools in this sub-sample. The full sample is not used in the 
empirical analysis and is shown only for comparison purposes. As we have discussed, our research design 
brings the focus on urban schools, the boundary sample being predominantly urban because of the greater 
density of boundaries and schools in urban areas. This urban sample, has higher levels of per-student 
spending (£3689 compared to £3256 on average at 2009 prices), higher levels of income from the central 
government grant (£2889 compared to £2589), and a higher Area Cost Adjustment index. Children in the 
boundary schools are more likely to be on Free School Meals, less likely to speak English as a first language 
and less likely to be White British, reflecting their urban locations. The table also summarises the distances 
between our matched schools in the 4-school cluster boundary sub-sample. The schools are on average close 
to each other (less than 1.4km apart) and less than 500 metres from the LA boundary. 
The lower two panels of Table 1 shows how the expenditure and income data looks when we difference 
across LA boundaries, for schools in the 4-school cluster boundary sample. In the middle panel, the data is 
collapsed to s-LA-s'-LA cells, where s and s' are the matched school identifiers. The reported statistics relate 
to the residuals from within-group regressions of the expenditure variables on an s-lea fixed effect. The means 
are therefore zero, by construction, but the standard deviations show the cross-sectional variation in 
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expenditure across LA boundaries. The lower panel repeats this analysis, but on s-LA-by-s’-LA-by-year cells, 
and shows the cross sectional variation across LA boundaries, combined with the time series variation within 
and across boundaries. Looking at the middle panel, we see one standard deviation in the differences in 
between-LA school expenditure for schools in the 4-school clusters is £349. One standard deviation in 
between-LA expenditure differences (that is the mean expenditure in schools in the neighbouring LAs, 
irrespective of whether these schools are close to the boundary or not) is less, at £271. There is also 
substantial variation in the income to schools from the LA across the LA boundaries, which will provide the 
cross-sectional variation for our first instrument in the IV regression analysis. The standard deviation of £209 
is about 50% of the standard deviation in the un-differenced boundary sample in the upper panel. The last row 
in the middle panel shows the predicted expenditure differentials when the expenditure is predicted from the 
ACA index differentials between LAs i.e. our second preferred instrument. This is £110.80. In summary, the 
raw cross-sectional differences in income from LAs to the boundary schools are quite substantial and about 
53% (i.e. 110.80/209.3) of this is attributable to the ACA (i.e. about 28% of the variance is due to the ACA 
differential). In the main results, we exploit variation in these expenditure variables and instruments over 
time, as well as the cross-sectional variation indicated in the middle panel. The corresponding descriptive 
statistics in the bottom panel indicate (by comparison with the middle panel) that 75-90% of the variance in 
the LA-income and ACA variables is cross-sectional and will provide the main source of variation in our data. 
Figures 2 and 3 provide more detail on our instrumental variables. Figure 2 shows the Area Cost 
Adjustments for LAs as they were in 2002 and 2009. The figure is arranged so that the 2002 adjustments are 
shown below the horizontal axis and the 2009 adjustments above the axis. Also, for presentational 
convenience, we have subtracted 1 from the actual value of the indices. This picture allows us to see where 
the identification will come from in our IV estimates that make use of these ACAs. Our IV strategy uses 
differentials between adjacent LAs in a given year (e.g. Haringey and Hackney in 2009 and in 2002), 
differences between neighbouring LAs in different years (e.g. comparing Haringey in 2009 with Hackney in 
2002) and differences for a school in a given LA over time (e.g. the change in the ACA for Hackney). The 
distribution of the instruments is shown in more detail in Figure 3. These are the distributions of the data 
shown in the bottom panel of Table 1. 
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5.2. Regression results 
Table 2a presents the first part of our central regression results, which relate to equations (4a), estimated 
by least squares methods without any instruments. Each coefficient and standard error is from a separate 
regression and show the change in standardised student test scores for a £1000 of additional per-student 
expenditure. There are four horizontal panels in the table, for different sized clusters starting with matched 
pairs (2-school clusters) and moving to 8-school clusters in the bottom panel. Looking across the table, there 
are six different specifications, in three pairs. The first column in each pair shows results without any control 
variables. The second column in each pair includes controls for student characteristics (FSM, ethnic group 
dummies, gender, month of birth, English first language, distance to the LA boundary and ks1 test scores, and 
the LA-level index of Additional Educational Needs used in the central government funding formula). 
For reference purposes, the first pair (column 1 and 2) presents simple OLS estimates on the boundary 
subsamples, but without school cluster fixed effects (i.e. the data is not differenced across boundaries as 
implied by equation 4a). Due to the needs-based resource allocation to schools (both from central government 
to LAs and from LAs to schools) the coefficients in the uncontrolled regressions (column 1) are negative and 
significant and cannot be interpreted as causal estimates. Column 2 adds in the control variables set, which 
drives the coefficient towards zero (and insignificance), as we would expect since these variables at least 
partially control for the factors that jointly determine resource allocation and student achievement. 
The second pair (columns 3 and 4) relates to a k-school-cluster fixed-effect regression of ks2 scores on 
school-level expenditures, where expenditure is an average over the preceding 4 years before the tests (i.e. 
equation 4a, with no instruments). The estimates in these specifications are negative, and, with no control 
variables, become significant as we move down the table to differences based on larger clusters. Controlling 
for student characteristics in column 2 renders all the estimates statistically insignificant. As discussed in 
section 4.2, these regression discontinuity design-based estimates use between school variation in expenditure 
that is still potentially correlated with unobserved school characteristics, when these characteristics are not 
effectively controlled for by the discontinuity-design. One reason for this failure in the discontinuity design is 
that schools will differ in their ability to attract additional funding from non-central sources (charities, events, 
special LA grants) for reasons that do not necessarily relate to geographical location, such as head teacher and 
staff motivation and effectiveness in fund raising, or random variation in student intakes that attract additional 
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funding (e.g. children with diagnosed additional needs). A second reason is that the matched schools are not 
perfectly co-located and so potentially not perfectly matched on unobserved characteristics of their student 
intake. These estimates therefore cannot be interpreted as causal. 
Columns 5 and 6 report the results when we use average LA primary school expenditure per student in 
place of school-level expenditure, thus mitigating the biases induced by school-specific unobservables. The 
coefficients become large, positive and statistically significant (except where we compare nearest school pairs 
in row 1). They are generally quite insensitive to the size of the school-cluster used, and whether or not 
control variables are included, although the coefficients are much more precise in the 4 to 8-school clusters, 
when we compare a school with more schools than just its nearest neighbour. The effect sizes imply that an 
increase of £1000 in average per-student spending in the LA as whole is associated with between 0.10 and 
0.18 of a standard deviation increase in student achievement at ks2. However, these estimates make it hard to 
judge the effect of additional spending at the school level, in that they do not adjust for the relationship 
between spending in the boundary schools and spending in the LA on average. 
Table 2b, provides the instrumental variables estimates of equations (4a/b). Note that we report the first 
stage F-statistics for the IV results. All of these are acceptable in terms of usual criteria for the strength of the 
instruments. Column 1,2 and 5,6 use school level mean income delegated to the school from the LA as the 
instrument (CFR category IO1, funds delegated by the LA). Columns 3,4 and 7,8 use the ACA index as an 
instrument. Columns 1,2 and 3,4 use the boundary subsample, but without cluster fixed effects, so do not 
exploit cross-boundary differences. We report these results in order to demonstrate that we need both 
differencing across boundaries and instrumental variables as a fully effective strategy. To see this, note that 
the IV estimates without fixed effects and without any control variables are negative and significant, and not 
so different from the OLS estimates. For similar reasons to the OLS estimates in Table 2a, this occurs because 
the LA funding-based instruments are correlated with the characteristics of schools that also determine school 
performance, due to needs based funding rules. Once we include control variables to partially adjust the 
estimates for these school characteristics, the estimates become positive and significant. However, it remains 
difficult to judge to what extent simply controlling for school characteristics in this way is an effective 
strategy.  
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Columns 5,6 and 7,8 combine the instrumental variables and cross-boundary differencing strategies. 
These IV estimates are all considerably larger in magnitude than the IV estimates that do not exploit only 
cross-boundary differences (columns 1-4). They are also, in most, cases, higher than the estimates in Table 2a 
column 5 and 6 that used cross-boundary differences, but no instruments. A crucial thing to note, both from 
Table 2a columns 5 and 6, and from Table 2b columns 5-8, is that the strategy of comparing funding 
differentials arising from LA-sources in closely spaced matched schools across LA boundaries seems to be 
effective in eliminating the biases induced by needs-based resourcing, because the estimates are much less 
sensitive to the inclusion of our set of control variables. The implication is that the LA-based funding 
instruments are uncorrelated with other factors determining pupil achievement (and we provide more 
evidence on this in the balancing tests below). In fact, for the LA-income instrumental variables estimates in 
columns 6 and 7 (where the instrument is the average grant paid from the LA to the schools within its 
control), the point estimates are almost identical with, and without any control variables. The ACA-index 
based IV estimates are more sensitive, and the conditional estimates in columns 8 are around 50% higher than 
the unconditional estimates in column 7, although this difference is less than 2 standard errors.    
The estimates from the 4 to 8-school clusters are again much more precise than in the 2-school clusters, 
and range from around 0.16 to 0.32. All are statistically significant at the 5 percent level or better, except for 
the specification in the top row of column 7. Although the IV estimates based on the ACA indices are 
potentially preferable on theoretical grounds, given they isolate a specific source of variation in funding, the 
LA-income based IV estimates yield more stable and statistically significant estimates. These LA-income IV 
estimates are not highly sensitive to the choice of school cluster size, nor to the control variable set. They 
have higher first stage F-statistics, which is to be expected given the greater variation shown in Figure 2. 
Overall, the IV results indicate that an additional £1000 per student paid to schools in these urban LA 
boundary settings, raised student test scores at ks2 by around 0.25 standard deviations. 
In these main specifications, identification of the expenditure effects comes from variation in 
expenditure across boundaries, and over time within the school-cluster. The point estimates are higher still if 
we control for school-cluster-by-year fixed effects such that we estimate using only the cross–sectional 
variation in expenditure, although the difference is less than one standard error – see Appendix Table A1. 
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5.3. Evaluating the identification strategy: balancing tests 
Table 3a and 3b report the balancing tests described in section 4.4. These results assess whether students  
and schools, that are in LAs with high income levels (Table 3a) or are subject to high ACAs (Table 3b) have 
different characteristics than those on the opposite side of LA boundaries that are subject to lower LA 
incomes and ACAs. The upper panel of each table shows estimates equivalent to the IV regression of Table 
2b, columns 5 and 7, for 4-school clusters, but with the dependent variable replaced by various student 
characteristics as set out in the table columns. The lower panel shows coefficients from regressions of the 
same characteristics using data in the boundary sub-sample,  aggregated to school cells. Both sets of 
regressions include school-cluster and year fixed effects. The top set of results in each panel shows the case 
with no control variables. The lower set of results shows the coefficients when we include a control for the 
LA-level Additional Educational Needs index that is used in the central government funding formula (this 
variable is in the control variable set in the odd-numbered columns of Table 2a/b). Including this control 
ensures that the variation in grants used to identify the impact of expenditure comes primarily from variation 
in the Area Cost Adjustments which is uncorrelated with other LA-specific disadvantages. 
For the most part, these balancing tests show that schools along LA boundaries that are exposed to 
different LA-incomes and ACAs do not have markedly different characteristics. There is no association 
between these instruments and early school achievements (ks1 at age 7), age, gender, English as first 
language, ethnicity18, or residential deprivation in the student level or school-level regressions. There is no 
association with school size (student numbers) or the average of students' residential neighbourhood house 
prices in the school level regression. 
The one obvious dimension on which the schools exposed to different LA-incomes and ACAs  do not 
appear to be well balanced is FSM entitlement. In the both the student and school level regressions, the 
coefficient is small, but significant, in the regressions without the LA AEN control. The reason for this 
association is most likely that school funding formulae allocating funds to LAs (and potentially to schools 
within LAs) depend explicitly on the proportions of families on income support, which also determines FSM 
entitlement, and it is hard to break this link in the empirical analysis. Indeed, controlling for the LA 
                                                     
18 There is an association with ethnicity when we do not  control for LA Additional Educational Needs (AEN) in the 
school-by-year level regressions. 
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Additional Educational Needs index – the index of families on income support that is used in the funding 
formula to LAs – in the second row in each panel reduces the size of the coefficient and renders it 
insignificant in the case of the  LA-income instrument, and less significant in the case of the ACA instrument. 
The question is, whether this failure of balancing in the uncontrolled estimates is of any consequence for the 
interpretation of Table 2. The positive sign of the coefficient in the FSM specification in Table 3 immediately 
suggests differential FSM status cannot explain the performance advantages in high-ACA schools, since FSM 
entitlement is also associated with lower ks2 achievement. More specifically, consider that the coefficient 
from a simple regression of standardised ks2 scores in FSM entitlement at student level (with no other control 
variables) is around -0.5. From Table 3, column (4) it can be inferred that a 5-6 percentage point increase in 
the probability a student being FSM-entitled is associated with a £1000 increase in total school expenditure 
per pupil. However, this relates to a 0.05*0.5 = 0.025 standard deviation fall in ks2 scores. This is not a big 
effect relative to the 0.25 standard deviation increase in ks2 scores attributed to £1000 in total expenditure per 
pupil in Table 2b and is of little substantive importance for the main findings on the effects of expenditure on 
ks2 scores.19 
Another reason for potential imperfect balancing across the LA boundary is if LA funding, and 
consequent school funding differentials, encourage sorting of households of different types across the 
boundary. The existence of house price differentials across school catchment area boundaries has been 
demonstrated by other studies and used a source of identification for the effects of school quality on house 
prices (Black 1999, Bayer et al 2010, Gibbons, Machin and Silva 2011), and such differentials potentially 
lead to this kind of sorting. Sorting of wealthier families into the neighbourhoods and schools on the side of 
the boundary with higher ACA-based funding could lead to amplification of the direct impacts of these 
resources. Given the scale of the effects in our results, we doubt that house-price related sorting is a major 
factor. To see this, consider that a one standard deviation increase in the ACA index is related to an £111 
increase in per-student funding per year, which implies an 111/1000 x 0.25 = 0.028 standard deviation 
increase in student performance (where the s.d. is in the student distribution). Given the standard deviation in 
performance across schools is around 30% of the standard deviation in the student distribution, this £111 
                                                     
19 Note that repeating this exercise for either 2,6 or 8-school cluster sizes, tends to improve the balancing in terms of 
FSM entitlement, but we report the 'worst case' so that the reader can judge for themselves the scientific credibility of the 
results. 
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funding differential corresponds to a  0.08 standard deviation differential in school performance. A typical 
estimate from the schools and house prices literature puts the house price response to a 1 standard deviation 
increase in performance at around 3% (e.g. see Gibbons and Machin 2008, Black and Machin 2011). 
Therefore, a 1 standard deviation increase in the ACA index would raise house prices by only 0.08*3 = 
0.24%, a price differential, or about £480 on a £200000 property typical at this time. This magnitude of price 
differential seems unlikely to lead to substantial educationally-relevant residential sorting. It should also be 
noted that the balancing tests indicate no statistically significant association between the instruments and 
housing prices, nor any association with achievements at age 7, which we would expect also to be affected if 
the results were driven by residential sorting that affected educational achievement. 
These results are shown in Table 4 (for the LA income instrument) and are not substantively any 
different from those in Table 2b, indicating that the coincidence of physical features and LA boundaries is of 
little relevance. 
5.4. Heterogeneity by school characteristics and subject 
Table 5 reports on heterogeneity by school characteristics. The split by school characteristics is based on 
whether or not a school has above or below-mean proportions of various student demographic groups. In 
these results, we use the LA-income instrument, because the ACA-index becomes too weak an instrument to 
give informative results for some of these subgroups, although the point estimates are similar (see Appendix 
A2). The overall story in Table 5 is that the effects of expenditure are considerably higher and more 
significant in schools with more ‘disadvantaged’ students. Expenditure appears not to have had an impact in 
schools with higher proportions of whites than average, schools where pupils come less disadvantaged 
neighbourhoods, nor schools where achievement at ks1 is above average. Evidently, expenditure has higher 
returns in schools where there are greater gains to be made at school level. Interestingly, these effects seems 
to be based on the type of school, not the type of student. Appendix A2 presents the breakdown by student 
type, rather than the school characteristics, and there appears to be relatively little difference. In other words, 
all types of students in the most disadvantaged schools appear to benefit from additional funding, not just the 
disadvantaged students, although it is hard to know what to conclude from this finding given we have no 
information on how additional resources were split within schools between different student types. 
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Lastly, Table 6 splits the ks2 score into subject areas – maths, science and English. It turns out that the 
strongest effects on achievement arise through scores in maths and science, with English showing a more 
moderate, but still significant response. It is not clear why expenditure effects should vary across subject 
areas. However, Machin et al. (2010) find the same result for a resource-based programme targeted at 
secondary schools in disadvantaged urban areas. 
5.5. How does was the additional money spent? 
Although we can say nothing about the causal effects of different spending categories on achievement, 
we show how the expenditure patterns relate to additional income in Table 7, using the method set out in 
Section 4.6. Our CFR schools expenditure data has a fairly detailed breakdown of the expenditure shares in 
various categories. For presentational simplicity, we aggregate some of these categories into 9 groups, 
teaching expenditure (including temporary agency and ‘supply’ staff), support staff (largely teaching 
assistants and specialist staff to assist with children with special needs), other staff (including administrative, 
catering and premises staff), personal development and training, premises (building and grounds maintenance, 
energy, cleaning, water and sewage, rates), learning and ICT resources, ‘bought in professional services’ 
(which includes various types of consultancy, self employed music teachers,  legal advice etc.), supplies 
(including catering and administrative supplies) and other costs (which include insurance costs, financial 
items such as loan interest and transfers to the capital budget). 
The bottom row of Table 7 shows the mean expenditure shares in these categories (in the boundary sub-
sample) over 2004-2009. More than half the budget goes on teaching staff, and just under 80% on direct staff 
costs in total. Non-staff items are each a relatively small share of the total. The coefficients in row 1 of the 
table are the effect of an additional £1000 in total school expenditure per student on the share of expenditure 
in each category. Clearly, all these effects are quite small, with an additional £1000 per student reducing the 
share spent on teachers by 3.7 percentage points. This is compensated for by an increase in the share spent on 
learning and ICT resources, professional services and supplies. These results indicate that additional income 
tends to get spent disproportionately on items other than teaching costs, although the changes in the shares are 
small, so the overall impression is that additional income is spread across all categories. The indivisibility of 
teaching expenditures may also contribute to these empirical results, given that small expenditure differentials 
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cannot easily be used to employ additional teachers (and are difficult to use to attract better teachers given 
lack of flexibility in teachers pay) and so would have to be spent in other ways.  
6. Discussion and conclusions 
Our findings indicate quite a strong role for general funding increases in raising achievement in urban 
state schools. Perhaps this should not be surprising. However convincing evidence of an impact from putting 
more money into state schools has remained elusive, so our analysis is a useful addition to the international 
academic literature on the economics of schooling. Although we can say little about the channels by which 
money raises achievement, or provide any guide to how the money should be spent when it reaches schools, 
the results are crucially important for higher-level policy making. 
The findings are particularly pertinent to current education funding proposals in England. The UK 
coalition government’s flagship school funding policy, the Pupil Premium, has started at £430 in 2010/11 
(approx 450 in 2009 prices), and is paid to schools on the basis of the number of disadvantaged students (as 
measured by eligibility to receive free school meals – FSM). The government proposes to raise this figure by 
a factor of 4 by 2014-15. However, FSM students are only 25% of the intake in the urban schools in our 
study, or 17% nationally. Therefore, since the Pupil Premium is simply additional funding for schools, and is 
not necessarily used for resources targeted specifically at FSM children, it amounts to additional income of at 
best about £100 per student initially, rising to perhaps £400 by 2014-15 (again at 2009 prices).20 According to 
our estimates, an additional £400 per student could be expected to raise ks2 achievement, on average, by 
about 10% of a standard deviation (based on the status quo in terms of all other institutional arrangements). A 
few more back of the envelope calculations (based on estimates in Table 4) indicate that, if used specifically 
for FSM students so that FSM students received an additional £2000 in resources, the Pupil Premium at its 
proposed final level might raise FSM student achievement by around 0.5 standard deviations. Probably 
coincidentally (since as far as we are aware such estimates were not used to determine the level of the Pupil 
Premium), this increase in achievement would almost exactly offset the 0.5 standard deviation gap that 
currently exists between FSM and non-FSM students in achievement at ks2, bringing FSM children in line 
                                                     
20 In fact, the pupil premium policy needs to be viewed in the context of rising inflation and (apart from the premium) no 
nominal increase in funding for schools. Some calculations based on government figures and an inflation rate of 4% 
suggest that although the pupil premium policy will have a redistributional impact, all schools experience a real decrease 
in funding.  
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with non-FSM children (on average). Although doubling the relative resources for FSM children is hard to 
envisage politically, this research suggests that traditional school resources policy have potential to largely 
eliminate the gap.  
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Figures 
 
Figure 1: Distribution of schools in the 4-school cluster boundary sub-sample  
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Figure 2: Area Cost Adjustments 
0.50
0.40
0.30
0.20
0.10
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
Kn
ow
sle
y
Se
ft
on
Do
nc
as
te
r
G
at
es
he
ad
So
ut
h T
yn
es
id
e
M
id
dl
es
br
ou
gh
Ci
ty
 of 
Ki
ng
st
on
‐up
on
‐Hu
ll
N
or
th
 Lin
co
ln
sh
ire
De
rb
ys
hi
re
Po
ol
e
Da
rli
ng
to
n
De
vo
n
He
re
fo
rd
sh
ire
Bl
ac
kb
ur
n
N
ot
tin
gh
am
 Cit
y
Co
rn
w
al
l
N
or
fo
lk
Su
ff
ol
k
Ru
tla
nd
Ki
rk
le
es
M
ed
w
ay
Br
ig
ht
on
 an
d H
ov
e
Du
dl
ey
W
al
sa
ll
Ha
lto
n
Bo
lto
n
O
ld
ha
m
St
oc
kp
or
t
W
ig
an
Ke
nt
Sw
in
do
n
Ci
ty
 of
 Br
ist
ol
Ha
m
ps
hi
re
Is
le
 of 
W
ig
ht
 Co
un
cil
Be
df
or
ds
hi
re
Th
ur
ro
ck
Br
om
le
y
Ha
rin
ge
y
Re
db
rid
ge
He
rt
fo
rd
sh
ire
W
in
ds
or
 & 
M
ai
de
nh
ea
d
W
es
t B
er
ks
hi
re
Ba
rn
et
Ha
rr
ow
Ki
ng
st
on
 up
on
 Th
am
es
Su
tt
on
Ha
ck
ne
y
Ke
ns
in
gt
on
 an
d C
he
lse
a
So
ut
hw
ar
k
W
es
tm
in
st
er
ACA in 2002 and 2009
 
Note: The 2002 adjustments are shown below the horizontal axis and the 2009 adjustments above the axis. 
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Figure 3: LA income differentials across boundaries (£000s) 
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Tables 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics. Expenditures are £ per pupil. 
  Full data set 4-school cluster 
boundary sub-sample 
 Mean s.d. Mean s.d. 
Student dataset     
Age-11 Total score 0 1.0 -0.024 0.984 
School total expenditure (4 year mean) £3256.40 £644.99 £3689.3 £829.6 
Income from LA grants   (4 year mean) £2589.32 £277.28 £2889.4 £424.8 
ACA index 1.041 0.063 1.112 0.100 
     
Distance to LA boundary (metres)   461.0 509.9 
Distance between paired schools   1354.7 399.5 
Boys 0.509 - 0.505 - 
FSM 0.166 - 0.282 - 
Age in months (within year) 5.471 3.484892 5.524 3.49 
English first language 0.881 - 0.690 - 
White British 0.820 - 0.574 - 
     
Student observations 3318152 34327 
Across-boundary funding differences in LA-
level data set (residuals) 
 Mean s.d. Max 
Total school expenditure  0.000 £349.4 £1341.3 
Mean LA primary expenditure  0.000 £270.5 £1031.3 
Mean income from LA  0.000 £209.3 £951.6 
Mean income predicted from ACA  0.000 £110.8 £404.2 
Across-boundary-over time  funding differences 
in LA-level data set (residuals) 
 Mean s.d. Max 
Total school expenditure  0.000 £440.1 £2185.7 
Mean LA primary expenditure  0.000 £366.3 £1750.0 
Mean income from LA  0.000 £242.7 £116.8 
Mean income predicted from ACA  0.000 £116.0 £477.2 
Observations   1839 in 140 clusters over 5 yrs 
   
Note: Table reports means and standard deviations 
Four-school cluster for school s composed of up to 3,  s'-schools within 2km of school s, in adjacent school district 
Nearest 3 schools are matched across LA boundaries by FSM (within 5 percentiles) 
Top panel summarises student-level data 
Bottom panel summarises funding differentials in data set collapsed to s-LA-s'-LA cell means. Figures are for residuals from 
regressions of funding variables on s-LA fixed effects. 
Data covers years 2003/4 to 2008/9. Expenditure and income in 2009 prices (deflated by Consumer Price Index) 
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Table 2a: Main results on the effects of school spending on student ks2 test scores at age 11. Each coefficient is from a separate regression. 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
 
School 
expenditure 
OLS 
School 
expenditure 
OLS 
School 
expenditure, 
cluster fixed 
fx 
School 
expenditure, 
cluster fixed 
fx 
LA mean 
expenditure, 
cluster fixed fx
LA mean 
expenditure, 
cluster fixed 
fx 
Two school clusters        
621 s, 764 s'-schools Total expenditure 4 yr mean -0.177*** -0.027 -0.060* 0.009 0.099 0.127* 
1145 s-s' pairs per pupil (1000s) (0.019) (0.016) (0.024) (0.023) (0.054) (0.055) 
197891 observations            
Four school clusters        
971 s, 1041 s'-schools Total expenditure 4 yr mean -0.154*** -0.013 -0.054* 0.019 0.139** 0.179*** 
1969 s-s' pairs per pupil (1000s) (0.017) (0.013) (0.021) (0.019) (0.045) (0.045) 
343237 observations            
Six school clusters        
1057 s, 1073 s’-schools Total expenditure 4 yr mean -0.149*** -0.007 -0.065** 0.012 0.141** 0.176*** 
2242 s-s' pairs per pupil (1000s) (0.017) (0.015) (0.023) (0.019) (0.048) (0.048) 
401701 observations            
Eight school clusters        
1076 s, 1084 s'-schools Total expenditure 4 yr mean -0.144*** -0.003 -0.061* 0.011 0.150** 0.176*** 
2358 s-s' pairs per pupil (1000s) (0.017) (0.015) (0.024) (0.020) (0.047) (0.048) 
429078 observations            
 Control variables No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Table reports regression coefficients and standard errors from student level regressions, 2004-2009 
Regressions in columns (3) to (6) include local cross-boundary k-school-cluster fixed effects 
k-school cluster for school s composed of up to k-1 s'-schools within 2km of school s, in adjacent school district 
Nearest schools are matched across LA boundaries by distance and FSM (within 5 percentiles) 
Dependent variables is standardised mean total score in English, Maths and Science 
Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation within LA boundary pairs 
Significance: ***0.1%, **1%, *5% 
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Table 2b: Main results on the effects of school spending on student ks2 test scores at age 11. IV estimates Each coefficient is from a separate regression. 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
 
LA income IV
 
LA income IV
 
LA ACA IV 
 
LA ACA IV 
 
LA income IV
cross-boundary
LA income IV
cross-boundary
LA ACA IV 
cross-boundary
LA ACA IV 
cross-boundary
Two school clusters          
621 s, 764 s'-schools Total expenditure 4 yr mean -0.117*** 0.080** -0.100*** 0.106** 0.180* 0.191* 0.183 0.286* 
1145 s-s' pairs per pupil (1000s) (0.025) (0.029) (0.030) (0.035) (0.076) (0.074) (0.119) (0.134) 
197891 observations First stage: F-stat 698.7 368.2 187.5 172.1 107.8 95.59 28.48 25.43 
Four school clusters          
971 s, 1041 s'-schools Total expenditure 4 yr mean -0.092*** 0.088*** -0.078** 0.089*** 0.234*** 0.245*** 0.201* 0.320*** 
1969 s-s' pairs per pupil (1000s) (0.021) (0.023) (0.025) (0.026) (0.060) (0.059) (0.086) (0.092) 
343237 observations First stage: F-stat 740.3 375.6 232.6 211.9 220.2 191.7 71.41 66.31 
Six school clusters          
1057 s, 1073 s’-schools Total expenditure 4 yr mean -0.083*** 0.103*** -0.073** 0.097*** 0.241*** 0.240*** 0.153* 0.275** 
2242 s-s' pairs per pupil (1000s) (0.021) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.064) (0.060) (0.077) (0.088) 
401701 observations First stage: F-stat 860.5 435.0 243.6 188.3 185.1 178.6 93.69 72.58 
Eight school clusters          
1076 s, 1084 s'-schools Total expenditure 4 yr mean -0.080*** 0.108*** -0.069** 0.102*** 0.256*** 0.244*** 0.163* 0.258** 
2358 s-s' pairs per pupil (1000s) (0.020) (0.023) (0.024) (0.025) (0.062) (0.060) (0.074) (0.083) 
429078 observations First stage: F-stat 911.5 428.1 266.3 181.5 183.8 172.7 104.2 76.54 
 Control variables No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Table reports regression coefficients and standard errors from student level regressions, 2004-2009 
Regressions include local cross-boundary k-school-cluster fixed effects 
k-school cluster for school s composed of up to k-1 s'-schools within 2km of school s, in adjacent school district 
Nearest schools are matched across LA boundaries by distance and FSM (within 5 percentiles) 
Dependent variables is standardised mean total score in English, Maths and Science 
Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation within LA boundary pairs 
Instrument is mean income per pupil from LA (mean in LA as a whole), or Area Cost Adjustment in central government funding formula (see text) 
Significance: ***0.1%, **1%, *5% 
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Table 3a: 'Balancing' tests. LA income instrument 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 
Standardised 
Age-7 ks1 tests  Age (months) Girls FSM 
English first 
language White 
Deprivation 
index 
Number of 
students 
Log house price 
4-schools: Student level IV          
Total exp pp 4yr -0.014 0.023 0.004 0.041*** -0.070 -0.092 0.047 - - 
Unconditional (0.049) (0.067) (0.008) (0.010) (0.061) (0.058) (0.024)   
          
Total exp pp 4yr -0.023 0.059 0.003 0.023 0.023 0.016 -0.012 - - 
Conditional on LA AEN (0.050) (0.086) (0.009) (0.012) (0.069) (0.062) (0.024)   
 343237 343237 343237 343237 343237 343237 285346   
4-schools: School-level          
LA income 0.000 -0.004 0.001 0.017*** -0.039 -0.049* 0.016 -5.919 -0.006 
Unconditional (0.022) (0.033) (0.004) (0.004) (0.024) (0.021) (0.012) (10.530) (0.014) 
          
LA income -0.009 0.016 0.001 0.008 -0.000 -0.004 -0.011 -14.089 -0.018 
Conditional on LA AEN (0.022) (0.044) (0.005) (0.005) (0.027) (0.021) (0.011) (10.017) (0.017) 
 8100 8100 8100 8100 8100 8100 6763 8100 8100 
Notes: Regressions of various characteristics on school expenditure variables.  Specifications include school-group fixed effects (4-school clusters) 
Results in top panel are from student-level regressions:  Refer to Table 2 
Results in bottom panel are from regressions on school s-school-by-s'-school aggregated cells. 
Regressions  conditional on LA AEN  include the LA index of Additional Educational Needs used in the central government formula (income support component) 
House prices are mean ln purchase prices for students attending the schools from 2005-2007 
Deprivation index is the index of Income Deprivation Affecting Children (IDACI) produced by the Department of Communities and Local Government 
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Table 3b: 'Balancing' tests. ACA index instrument 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 
Standardised 
Age-7 ks1 tests  Age (months) Girls FSM 
English first 
language White 
Deprivation 
index 
Number of 
students 
Log house price 
4-schools: Student level IV          
Total exp pp 4yr -0.092 0.146 0.018 0.062*** -0.065 -0.063 0.032 - - 
Unconditional (0.068) (0.100) (0.016) (0.014) (0.070) (0.056) (0.024)   
          
Total exp pp 4yr -0.117 0.202 0.022 0.054** 0.000 0.018 -0.012 - - 
Conditional on LA AEN (0.082) (0.113) (0.019) (0.018) (0.084) (0.066) (0.026)   
 343237 343237 343237 343237 343237 343237 285346   
4-schools: School-level          
ACA index -0.033 0.055 0.005 0.021*** -0.026 -0.024 0.013 1.591 0.024 
Unconditional (0.024) (0.040) (0.006) (0.006) (0.027) (0.023) (0.012) (9.348) (0.014) 
          
ACA index -0.040 0.070 0.006 0.015* 0.001 0.008 -0.004 -1.462 0.021 
Conditional on LA AEN (0.025) (0.040) (0.006) (0.006) (0.026) (0.021) (0.010) (9.957) (0.014) 
 8100 8100 8100 8100 8100 8100 6763 8100 8100 
Notes: Regressions of various characteristics on school expenditure variables.  Specifications include school-group fixed effects (4-school clusters) 
Results in top panel are from student-level regressions:  Refer to Table 2 
Results in bottom panel are from regressions on school s-school-by-s'-school aggregated cells. 
Regressions  conditional on LA AEN  include the LA index of Additional Educational Needs used in the central government formula (income support component) 
House prices are mean ln purchase prices for students attending the schools from 2005-2007 
Deprivation index is the index of Income Deprivation Affecting Children (IDACI) produced by the Department of Communities and Local Government 
- 36 - 
 
Table 4: Results using boundaries that do not coincide with features. Effects of 
school spending on student ks2 test scores at age 11.  Each coefficient is from a
separate regression using 4-school clusters. 
  (1) (2) 
 
LA income IV 
cross-boundary 
LA income IV 
cross-boundary 
Control variables No Yes 
   
Total expenditure 4 yr mean 0.225*** 0.209** 
per pupil (1000s) (0.067) (0.064) 
First stage: F-stat 195.8 160.1 
   
Number of observations: 297138 students in 833 4-school clusters 
Notes: refer to Table 2 
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Table 5: Heterogeneity in effect of expenditure by school characteristics. LA Income IV-fixed effect estimates. 4-school clusters 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10 
 
Age-11 
ks2 total 
score 
Age-11 
ks2 total 
score 
Age-11 
ks2 total 
score 
Age-11 
ks2 total 
score 
Age-11 
ks2 total 
score 
Age-11 
ks2 total 
score 
Age-11 
ks2 total 
score 
Age-11 
ks2 total 
score 
Age-11 
ks2 total 
score 
Age-11 
ks2 total 
score 
 
High 
FSM Low FSM 
More 
boys More girls 
High 
white 
High non-
white 
Low age-
7 score 
High age-
7 score 
High inc. 
deprived 
Low inc. 
deprived 
           
Total exp pp 4yr 0.289*** 0.098 0.251** 0.349*** 0.020 0.334*** 0.240*** 0.229** 0.323*** 0.202 
Unconditional (0.060) (0.105) (0.096) (0.075) (0.162) (0.058) (0.069) (0.082) (0.063) (0.106) 
1st stage F-stat 153.4 82.32 112.6 94.05 85.78 171.0 158.8 107.0 152.1 82.56 
           
Total exp pp 4yr 0.371*** -0.073 0.266*** 0.330*** -0.074 0.382*** 0.297*** 0.185 0.392*** -0.027 
Conditional (0.067) (0.112) (0.077) (0.075) (0.147) (0.071) (0.060) (0.108) (0.072) (0.109) 
1st stage F-stat 161.1 56.86 154.2 104.0 48.20 135.2 193.2 76.86 147.4 74.84 
 153806 189431 186714 156523 177025 166212 188666 154571 153574 189663 
Notes as Table 2 
Low age-7 score is below Level 2b in Reading, Writing and Maths; High score is Level 2a or above in Reading, Writing and Maths 
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Table 6: Effects of school spending on student ks2 test scores at age 11.  Each 
coefficient is from a separate regression using 4-school clusters. 
  (1) (2) 
 
LA income IV 
cross-boundary 
LA income IV 
cross-boundary 
Control variables No Yes 
Maths   
Total expenditure 4 yr mean 0.198*** 0.221*** 
per pupil (1000s) (0.059) (0.055) 
   
Science   
Total expenditure 4 yr mean 0.260*** 0.261*** 
per pupil (1000s) (0.060) (0.063) 
   
English   
Total expenditure 4 yr mean 0.169** 0.175** 
per pupil (1000s) (0.060) (0.063) 
   
Notes: refer to Table 2 
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Table 7: Response of expenditure shares to total expenditure per pupil. LA Income IV-fixed effect estimates. 4-school clusters 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Teachers 
Education 
support 
staff Other staff 
Develop-
ment and 
Training Premises 
Learning 
resources 
and ICT 
Profess-
ional 
services 
Supplies Other 
          
          
Total exp pp (£000s) -0.037*** -0.000 -0.003 0.000 0.001 0.009** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.003 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) 
1st stage F-stat 144.0 144.0 144.0 144.0 144.0 144.0 144.0 144.0 144.0 
Mean share 56.4% 14.7% 8.4% 0.5% 6.6% 4.7% 3.0% 3.8% 1.8% 
          
IV regressions of expenditure shares on total expenditure. 
Number of school-by-year observations = 8123 
School-by-year level regressions. Years 2004-2009 
Instrument is  
Teachers: includes teachers, supply and agency teachers 
Other staff includes: administrative, clerical, premises, catering and other employees 
Premises includes: Building maintenance and improvement; grounds maintenance and improvement; cleaning and caretaking; water and sewerage 
energy; rates; other occupation costs 
Professional services includes: bought in professional services – curriculum; bought in professional services – other 
Supplies includes: administrative and catering supplies 
Other includes: insurance costs, loans, other financial outlays 
Instrument is mean income per pupil from LA (mean in LA as a whole) 
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Appendix Tables 
 
 
Table A1: Effects of school spending on student ks2 test scores at age 11.  Each coefficient is from a separate regression using 4-
school clusters. Estimates on cross-boundary, cross-sectional variation only. 
  (1) (2) (4) (5) 
 
LA income IV 
cross-boundary 
LA income IV 
cross-boundary 
LA ACA IV 
cross-boundary 
LA ACA IV 
cross-boundary 
Control variables No Yes No Yes 
     
Total expenditure 4 yr mean 0.306*** 0.267*** 0.275** 0.379** 
per pupil (1000s) (0.074) (0.075) (0.098) (0.119) 
1st stage F-stat 251.6 170.5 50.02 49.15 
     
Notes: refer to Table 2 
Regressions include local cross-boundary k-school-cluster-by-year fixed effects 
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Table A2: Heterogeneity in effect of expenditure by pupil and school. LA Income IV-fixed effect estimates. 4-school clusters 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10 
 
Age-11 
ks2 total 
score 
Age-11 
ks2 total 
score 
Age-11 
ks2 total 
score 
Age-11 
ks2 total 
score 
Age-11 
ks2 total 
score 
Age-11 
ks2 total 
score 
Age-11 
ks2 total 
score 
Age-11 
ks2 total 
score 
Age-11 
ks2 total 
score 
Age-11 
ks2 total 
score 
 FSM Not FSM Boys Girls White 
Non-
white 
Low age-
7 score 
High age-
7 score 
High inc. 
deprived 
Low inc. 
deprived 
By student type                 
Total exp pp 4yr 0.289*** 0.222** 0.274*** 0.196** 0.248* 0.202*** 0.281*** 0.152** 0.152** 0.274*** 
Unconditional (0.053) (0.074) (0.064) (0.060) (0.102) (0.052) (0.070) (0.049) (0.049) (0.070) 
1st stage F-stat 187.9 234.2 214.8 224.1 188.8 190.5 201.5 218.2 218.2 179.2 
           
Total exp pp 4yr 0.301*** 0.199** 0.278*** 0.211*** 0.186* 0.299*** 0.259** 0.178** 0.306*** 0.073 
Conditional (0.071) (0.067) (0.058) (0.063) (0.095) (0.057) (0.085) (0.060) (0.064) (0.088) 
1st stage F-stat 181.8 183.0 194.3 188.0 136.6 164.0 194.9 153.9 193.2 116.3 
 96774 246461 173331 169906 197227 146003 67388 76053 76053 133013 
By school characteristics           
Total exp pp 4yr 0.289*** 0.098 0.251** 0.349*** 0.020 0.334*** 0.240*** 0.229** 0.323*** 0.202 
Unconditional (0.060) (0.105) (0.096) (0.075) (0.162) (0.058) (0.069) (0.082) (0.063) (0.106) 
1st stage F-stat 153.4 82.32 112.6 94.05 85.78 171.0 158.8 107.0 152.1 82.56 
           
Total exp pp 4yr 0.371*** -0.073 0.266*** 0.330*** -0.074 0.382*** 0.297*** 0.185 0.392*** -0.027 
Conditional (0.067) (0.112) (0.077) (0.075) (0.147) (0.071) (0.060) (0.108) (0.072) (0.109) 
1st stage F-stat 161.1 56.86 154.2 104.0 48.20 135.2 193.2 76.86 147.4 74.84 
 153806 189431 186714 156523 177025 166212 188666 154571 153574 189663 
Notes as Table 2 
Low age-7 score is below Level 2b in Reading, Writing and Maths; High score is Level 2a or above in Reading, Writing and Maths 
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